

Approved For Release 2008/05/16 : GPO : 1975A006800440001-8

TOP SECRET

25X1

21 February 1963

25X1

Copy No. *Ed-19*

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



State Dept. review completed

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Approved For Release 2008/05/16 : GPO : 1975A006800440001-8

TOP SECRET

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800440001-8


Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800440001-8

21 February 1963

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

1. Mexico-Venezuela: Communist-inspired demonstrations may greet Betancourt when he visits Mexico 23 and 24 February. (Page 1)
2. Cuba: Castro will address some party cadres on 22 February. (Page 2)



4. Congo: Adoula under criticism from some of his closest supporters. (Page 4)
5. Bulgaria: Regime ponders how to cope with its African student problem. (Page 5)
6. Yugoslavia - West Germany: Yugoslavia decides to adopt hostile policy toward West Germany. (Page 6)



9. Notes: Cuba; Communist China; Yemen-UK; Europe - Japan - US Imports; Togo; South Korea. (Page 9)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

21 February 1963

DAILY BRIEF

Mexico-Venezuela: Leaders of the Mexican Communist Party and of Communist-dominated front groups are planning hostile demonstrations when Venezuelan President Betancourt visits Mexico on 23 and 24 February, [redacted]

25X1

(Pro-Communist former President Cardenas reportedly has endorsed the plan in principle. He regards it as a means of impressing the government with the groups' combined ability to incite mass activity, but he is pretending ignorance and intends to be away from Mexico City during the demonstrations.)

(Mexican security forces, concerned over the possibility of disturbances during the Betancourt visit, [redacted]

[redacted] are probably capable of preventing any acts of violence from getting out of hand.)

25X1

Cuba: Fidel Castro, in a speech scheduled for 22 February, is likely to set the stage for new steps in the formal organization of the Cuban political party machine, which has been promised for this year.

Castro is to address party cadres from Cuba's three western provinces. This will be his first known speech to a strictly party audience since last spring when veteran Communist Anibal Escalante and his followers were purged from offices in the provisional party organ, the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations.

The development of the party, which is to be known as the United Party of the Socialist Revolution (PURS), was interrupted during the crisis last fall. Since the easing of the crisis, meetings have resumed at work centers throughout the country. At these meetings, "outstanding workers" have been "elected" to PURS cells. Che Guevara has predicted that the party's initial membership will be between 50,000 and 60,000.

The membership of the top organizations of the new party will probably reveal recent changes in the relative standing of high Cuban leaders. Fidel Castro will use the new party organization to strengthen his personal position further.

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800440001-8

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800440001-8

Congo: (Premier Adoula is under increasing criticism from some of his closest supporters.)

(Despite Adoula's success in ending Katanga's secession, Congo Army chief Mobutu, Sureté chief Nendaka, Foreign Minister Bomboko, and National Bank Governor Ndele have separately criticized him as weak and indecisive. They express doubt that Adoula will be able to control Parliament when it reconvenes in March. They fear that Parliament will insist on taking up various domestic issues, instead of confining discussion to the new draft constitution, and might overthrow Adoula.)

(These critics have not yet given any sign that they have considered possible alternatives to Adoula's leadership.)

Bulgaria: The Bulgarian regime apparently is still considering how to cope with its African student problem.

Following the demonstrations on 12 February in Sofia, 34 of the approximately 350 African students representing 23 countries had left by 17 February, and another 21 had definite plans to leave by 20 February. In addition, 58 students continued to plead with non-bloc diplomats for aid in leaving Bulgaria. The US Legation in Sofia estimates that with foreign assistance as many as 100 would leave.

Bulgarian authorities have freely granted exit permits to all but north African students but have made only a few minor gestures to all those remaining. Officials and professors told the student body that a police official involved in the repression of the 12 February demonstration had been arrested, one student claimed that the Bulgarians had offered to raise stipends by 50 percent, and others reported that authorities had offered "concessions" in housing.

The regime, however, has not lifted its ban on the All-African Student Union, has sent eviction notices to some students, has physically maltreated those arrested on 12 February, and has tried to force others to make public statements belittling the incident.

25X1

21 Feb 63

DAILY BRIEF

5

25X1

Yugoslavia - West Germany: (Yugoslavia has decided to adopt a hostile policy toward West Germany, beginning next month.)

(A Yugoslav Foreign Ministry official indicated to Ambassador Kennan that Belgrade has lost patience with Bonn's refusal to attempt seriously to resolve pressing bilateral problems. Ambassador Kennan considers that Belgrade's decision is probably a by-product of Belgrade's rapprochement with the Soviet bloc, and may result in even closer ties with the bloc.)

(Belgrade is planning a campaign to persuade the nonaligned states to recognize the East German regime. It will raise its representation in Pankow to the embassy level. At the same time, it will break off consular relations with Bonn and recall Yugoslav students from West Germany.)

(Belgrade plans to use the UN as a forum for criticizing Bonn's refusal to discuss compensation for war victims. The regime also will ban German-language instruction in Yugoslav schools and will disseminate anti-German propaganda to "educate" the Yugoslav people.)

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800440001-8

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800440001-8

25X1

NOTES

Cuba:

[REDACTED] Cuban chiefs of mission recently were recalled and instructed not to lean so heavily on the advice of Soviet colleagues. The diplomats recalled included those assigned to West European capitals, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Consultations in most cases lasted from late December until early this month.

Communist China: Chinese Communist personnel in overseas posts are being told in briefing sessions that China has passed the worst of its economic difficulties and is in a better position to push its strategy of violence.

[REDACTED] the situation in Vietnam is particularly promising. While briefings of this sort are in part indoctrination sessions which include propagandistic statements, they often reflect the general line of thinking in Peiping.

Yemen- UK: Britain claims that a small unit of Yemeni Government forces has seized a watering place in the Aden Protectorate and has asked the US to convey a protest to the Yemeni. The British say that unless the Yemeni withdraw within 48 hours, Aden forces will expel them. The Yemeni authorities, convinced for some time that Britain is supplying royalist tribes, may be trying to stop the alleged arms infiltration. On the other hand, the border in the area is poorly defined and the incursion may have been accidental.

25X1

25X1 [redacted]

Europe - Japan - US Imports: The Common Market countries, Great Britain, and Japan have in the past week all reiterated strong opposition to further restrictions by the US on imports of woolen textiles. Officials from these countries have indicated that such restrictions, which they are aware are under consideration in Washington, would encourage existing antagonism against alleged US protective trade practices, lead to pressure for retaliation, and seriously worsen prospects for negotiations under the US Trade Expansion Act.

25X1 [redacted]

25X1 [redacted]

Togo: The governments of the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, and Dahomey have decided not to accord de jure recognition to the provisional Togolese Government. They hope that diplomatic isolation will encourage a favorable solution of the Togolese internal crisis, but they may, in fact, be giving Ghana a greater opportunity to influence the course of events in Togo. So far only three states--Ghana, Senegal, and Lebanon--have extended de jure recognition.

25X1 [redacted]

South Korea: If former security chief Kim Chong-pil carries through with his announced intention to withdraw from politics, prospects will improve for a relatively smooth transition to civilian government in South Korea. Kim's announcement was not voluntary, however, and as long as he is in the country the possibility remains that he will try to retain his position as the regime's number-two man and leader of its new political party.

25X1 [redacted]

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

The United States Intelligence Board, on 20 February 1963, approved the following national intelligence estimate:

SNIE 54/59-63: "Prospects for Malaysia"

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800440001-8

THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
 Special Counsel to the President
 The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
 The Scientific Adviser to the President
 The Director of the Budget
 The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Department of State
 The Secretary of State
 The Under Secretary of State
 The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
 The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
 The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
 The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
 The Secretary of the Treasury
 The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Deputy Secretary of Defense
 The Secretary of the Army
 The Secretary of the Navy
 The Secretary of the Air Force
 The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
 The Assistant Secretary of Defense
 The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
 Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
 Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
 Chief of Staff, United States Army
 Commandant, United States Marine Corps
 U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
 Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
 Commander in Chief, Pacific
 Commander in Chief, Atlantic
 The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
 The Director, The Joint Staff
 The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
 The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
 The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
 The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
 The Attorney General
 The Federal Bureau of Investigation
 The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
 The Chairman
The National Security Agency
 The Director
The United States Information Agency
 The Director
The National Indications Center
 The Director

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800440001-8

Approved For Release 2002/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T0075A006800440001-8

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2002/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T0075A006800440001-8

TOP SECRET

STAT

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800440001-8

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800440001-8